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Abstract
In a recent paper Griffiths claims that the consistent histories interpretation of quantummechanics
gives rise to results that contradict those obtained from the Bohm interpretation. This is in spite
of the fact that both claim to provide a realist interpretation of the formalism without the need to
add any new mathematical content and both always produce exactly the same probability predictions
of the outcome of experiments. In contrasting the differences Griffiths argues that the consistent
histories interpretation provides a more physically reasonable account of quantum phenomena. We
examine this claim and show that the consistent histories approach is not without its difficulties.
1 Introduction
It is well known that realist interpretations of the quantum formalism are known to be notoriously difficult
to sustain and it is only natural that the two competing approaches, the consistent history interpretation
(CH) [1] [2] and the Bohm interpretation (BI)[3][4], should be carefully compared and contrasted. Griffiths
[5] is right to explore how the two approaches apply to interferometers of the type shown in figure 1.
Although the predictions of experimental outcomes expressed in terms of probabilities are identical,
Griffiths argues that, nevertheless, the two approaches actually give very different accounts of how a
particle is supposed to pass through such an interferometer. After a detailed analysis of experiments based
on figure 1, he concludes that the CH approach gives a behaviour that is ‘physically acceptable’, whereas
the Bohm trajectories behave in a way that appears counter-intuitive and therefore ‘unacceptable’. This
behaviour has even been called ‘surrealistic’ by some authors1. Griffiths concludes that a particle is
unlikely to actually behave in such a way so that one can conclude that the CH interpretation gives a
‘more acceptable’ account of quantum phenomena.
Notice that these claims are being made in spite of the fact no new mathematical structure whatsoever
is added to the quantum formalism in either CH or BI, and in consequence all the experimental predictions
of both CH and BI are identical to those obtained from standard quantum mechanics. Clearly there is
a problem here and the purpose of our paper is to explore how this difference arises. We will show that
CH is not without its difficulties.
We should remark here in passing that these difficulties have already been brought out be Bassi and
Ghirardi [8] [9] [10] and an answer has been given by Griffiths [11]. At this stage we will not take sides
in this general debate. Instead will examine carefully how the analysis of the particle behaviour in CH
when applied to the interferometer shown in figure 1 leads to difficulties similar to those highlighted by
Bassi and Ghirardi [8].
1This original criticism was made by Englert et al. [6]. An extensive discussion of this position has been presented by
Hiley, Callaghan and Maroney [7].
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Figure 1: Simple interferometer
2 Histories and trajectories
The first problem we face in comparing the two approaches is that BI uses a mathematically well defined
concept of a trajectory, whereas CH does not use such a notion, defining a more general notion of a
history.
Let us first deal with the Bohm trajectory, which arises in the following way. If the particle satisfies
the Schro¨dinger equation then the trajectories are identified with the one-parameter solutions of the real
part of the Schro¨dinger equation obtained under polar decomposition of the wave function [4]. Clearly
these one-parameter curves are mathematically well defined and unambiguous.
CH does not use the notion of a trajectory. It uses instead the concept of a history, which, again, is
mathematically well defined to be a series of projection operators linked by Schro¨dinger evolution and
satisfying a certainty consistency condition [1]. Although in general a history is not a trajectory, in the
particular example considered by Griffiths, certain histories can be considered to provide approximate
trajectories. For example, when particles are described by narrow wave packets, the history can be
regarded as defining a kind of broad ‘trajectory’ or ‘channel’. It is assumed that in the experiment shown
in figure 1, this channel is narrow enough to allow comparison with the Bohm trajectories.
To bring out the apparent difference in the predictions of the two approaches, consider the interfer-
ometer shown in figure 1. According to CH if we choose the correct framework, we can say that if C
fires, the particle must have travelled along the path c to the detector and any other path is regarded
as “dynamically impossible” because it violates the consistency conditions. The type of trajectories that
would be acceptable from this point of view are sketched in figure 2. In contrast a pair of typical Bohm
trajectories 2 are shown in figure 3 . Such trajectories are clearly not what we would expect from our
experience in the classical world. Furthermore there appears, at least at first sight, to be no visible
structure present that would ‘cause’ the trajectories to be ‘reflected’ in the region I, although in this
region interference between the two beams is taking place.
In the Bohm approach, an additional potential, the quantum potential, appears in the region of
interference and it is this potential that has a structure which ‘reflects’ the trajectories as shown in figure
3. (See Hiley et al. [7] for more details).
In this short note we will show that the conclusions reached by Griffiths [5] cannot be sustained and
that it is not possible to conclude that the Bohm ‘trajectories’ must be ‘unreliable’ or ‘wrong’. We will
show that CH cannot be used in this way and the conclusions drawn by Griffiths are not sound.
2Detailed examples of these trajectories will be found in Hiley, Callaghan and Maroney [7].
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Figure 2: The CH ‘trajectories’.
Figure 3: The Bohm trajectories.
3 The interference experiment
Let us analyse the experimental situation shown in figure 1 from the point of view of CH. A unitary
transformation U(tj+1, tj) is used to connect set of projection operators at various times. The times of
interest in this example will be t0, t1, and t2. t0 is a time before the particle enters the beam splitter, t2
is the time at which a response occurs in one of the detectors C or D and t1 is some intermediary time
when the particle is in the interferometer before the region I is reached by the wave packets.
The transformation for t0 → t1 is
|ψ0〉 = |sCD〉0 → 1√
2
[|cCD〉1 + |dCD〉1] (1)
The transformation for t1 → t2 is, according to Griffiths [13],[5]
|cCD〉1 → |C∗D〉2, and |dCD〉1 → |CD∗〉2 (2)
These lead to the histories
ψ0 ⊗ c1 ⊗ C∗2 , and ψ0 ⊗ d1 ⊗D∗)2 (3)
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Here ψ0 is short hand for the projection operator |ψ〉〈ψ| at time t0 etc.
These are not the only possible consistent histories but only these two histories are used by Griffiths
to make judgements about the Bohm trajectories. The two other possible histories
ψ0 ⊗ d1 ⊗ C∗2 , and ψ0 ⊗ c1 ⊗D∗2 (4)
have zero weight and are therefore deemed to be dynamically impossible.
The significance of the histories described by equation (3) is that they give rise to new conditional
probabilities that cannot be obtained from the Born probability rule [12]. These conditional probabilities
are
Pr(c1|ψ0 ∧ C∗2 ) = 1, P r(d1|ψ0 ∧D∗2) = 1. (5)
Starting from a given initial state, ψ0, these probabilities are interpreted as asserting that when the
detector C is triggered at t2, one can be certain that, at the time t1, the particle was in the channel c
and not in the channel d. In other words when C fires we know that the triggering particle must have
travelled down path c with certainty.
This is the key new result from which the difference between the predictions of CH and the Bohm
approach arises. Furthermore it must be stressed that this result cannot be obtained from the Born
probability rule and is claimed by Griffiths [12] to be a new result that does not appear in standard
quantum theory3.
Looking again at figure 1, we notice that there is a region I where the wave packets travelling down
c and d overlap. Here interference can and does take place. In fact fringes will appear along any vertical
plane in this region as can be easily demonstrated. Indeed this interference is exactly the same as that
produced in a two-slit experiment. The only change is that the two slits have been replaced by two
mirrors. Once this is realised alarm-bells should ring because the probabilities in (5) imply that we know
with certainty through which slit the particle passed. Indeed equation (5) shows that the particles passing
through the lower slit will arrive in the upper region of the fringe pattern, while those passing through
the upper slit will arrive in the lower half 4.
Recall that Griffiths claims CH provides a clear and consistent account of standard quantum me-
chanics, but the standard theory denies the possibility of knowing which path the particle took when
interference is present. Thus the interpretation of equation (5) leads to a result that is not part of the
standard quantum theory and in fact contradicts it. Nevertheless CH uses the authority of the standard
approach to strengthen its case against the Bohm approach. Surely this cannot be correct.
Indeed Griffiths has already discussed the two-slit experiment in an earlier paper [14]. Here he argues
that CH does not allow us to infer through which slit the particle passes. He writes; -
Given this choice at t3 [whether C or D fires], it is inconsistent to specify a decomposition at
time t2 [our t1] which specifies which slit the particle has passed through, i.e., by including
the projector corresponding to the particle being in the region of space just behind the A slit
[our c], and in another region just behind the B slit [our d]. That is (15) [the consistency
condition] will not be satisfied if projectors of this type at time t2 [our t1] are used along with
those mentioned earlier for time t3.
The only essential difference between the two-slit experiment and the interferometer described by
equation (3) above is in the position of the detectors. But according to CH measurement merely reveals
what is already there, so that the position of the detector in the region I or beyond should not affect
anything. Thus there appears to be a contradiction here.
To emphasise this difficulty we will spell out the contradiction again. The interferometer in figure
1 requires the amplitude of the incident beam to be split into two before the beams are brought back
together again to overlap in the region I. This is exactly the same process occurring in the two-slit
experiment. Yet in the two-slit experiment we are not allowed to infer through which slit the particle
3It should be noted that the converse of (5) must also hold. Namely, if C does not fire then we can conclude that at t1
the particle was not in pathway c. In other words Pr(c1|ψ0 ∧C2) = 0
4Notice that in criticising the Bohm approach, it is this consistent history interpreted as a ‘particle trajectory’ that is
contrasted with the Bohm trajectory. The Bohm approach reaches the opposite conclusion, namely, the particle that goes
through the top slit stays in the top part of the interference pattern [15]
4
passed while retaining interference, whereas according to Griffiths we are allowed to talk about which
mirror the particle is reflected off, presumably without also destroying the interference in the region I.
We will return to this specific point again later.
One way of avoiding this contradiction is to assume the following: -
1. If we place our detectors in the arms c and d before the interference region I is reached then we
have the consistent histories described in equation (3). Particles travelling down c will fire C, while those
travelling down d will fire D. In this case we have an exact agreement with the Bohm trajectories.
2. If we place our detectors in the region of interference I then, according to Griffiths [14], the histories
described by equation (3) are no longer consistent. In this case CH can say nothing about trajectories.
3. If we place our detectors in the positions shown in figure 1, then, according to Griffiths [5], the
consistent histories are described by equation (3) again. Here the conditional probabilities imply that all
the particles travelling down c will always fire C. Bohm trajectories contradict this result and show that
some of these particles will cause D to fire . These trajectories are shown in figure 3.
It could be argued that this patchwork would violate the one-framework rule. Namely that one must
either use the consistent histories described by equation (3) or use a set of consistent histories that do
not allow us to infer off which mirror the particle was reflected. This latter would allow us to account
for the interference effects that must appear in the region I.
A typical set of consistent histories that do not allow us to infer through which slit the particle passed
can be constructed in the following way.
Introduce a new set of projection operators |(c+ d)〉〈(c + d)| at t3 where t1 < t3 < t2. Then we have
the following possible histories
ψ0 ⊗ (c+ d)3 ⊗ C∗2 , and ψ0 ⊗ (c+ d)3 ⊗D∗2 (6)
Clearly from this set of histories we cannot infer any generalised notion of a trajectory so that we cannot
say from which mirror the particle is reflected. What this means then is that if we want to talk about
trajectories we must, according to CH, use the histories described by equation (3) to cover the whole
region as, in fact, Griffiths [5] actually does. But then surely the nodes in the interference pattern at I
will cause a problem.
To bring out this problem let us first forget about theory and consider what actually happens experi-
mentally as we move the detector C along a straight line towards the mirror M1. The detection rate will
be constant as we move it towards the region I. Once it enters this region, we will find that its counting
rate varies and will go through several zeros corresponding to the nodes in the interference pattern. Here
we will assume that the detector is small enough to register these nodes.
Let us examine what happens to the conditional probabilities as the detector crosses the interference
region. Initially according to (5), the first history gives the conditional probability Pr(c1|ψ0 ∧ C∗3 ) = 1.
However, at the nodes this conditional probability cannot even be defined as Pr(C∗3 ) = 0. Let us start
again with the closely related conditional probability, derived from the same history Pr(C∗3 |ψ0 ∧ c1) = 1.
Now this probability clearly cannot be continued across the interference region because Pr(C∗3 ) = 0 at the
nodes, while Pr(ψ0 ∧ c1) = 0.5 regardless of where the detector is placed. In fact, there is no consistent
history that includes both c1 and C
∗
3 , when the detector is in the interference region. We are thus forced
to consider different consistent histories in different regions as we discussed above.
If we follow this prescription then when the detector C is placed on the mirror side of path c, before
the beams cross at I, we can talk about trajectories and as stated above these trajectories agree with
the corresponding Bohm trajectories. When C is moved right through and beyond the region I, we can
again talk about trajectories. However in the intermediate region CH does not allow us to talk about
trajectories. This means that we have no continuity across the region of interference and this lack of
continuity means that it is not possible to conclude that any ‘trajectory’ defined by ψ0⊗c1⊗C∗ before C
reaches the interference region is the same ‘trajectory’ defined by the same expression after C has passed
through the interference region. In other words we cannot conclude that any particle travelling down c
will continue to travel in the same direction through the region of interference and emerge still travelling
in the same direction to trigger detector C.
What this means is that CH cannot be used to draw any conclusions on the validity or otherwise of
the Bohm trajectories. These latter trajectories are continuous throughout all regions. They are straight
lines from the mirror until they reach the region I. They continue into the region of interference, but no
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longer travel in straight lines parallel to the initial their paths. They show ‘kinks’ that are characteristic
of interference-type bunching that is needed to account for the interference [15]. This bunching has the
effect of changing the direction of the paths in such a way that some of them eventually end up travelling
in straight lines towards detector D and not C as Griffiths would like them to do.
Indeed it is clear that the existence of the interference pattern means that any theory giving relevance
to particle trajectories must give trajectories that do not move in straight lines directly through the
region I. The particles must avoid the nodes in the interference pattern. CH offers us no reason why
the trajectories on the mirror side of I should continue in the same general direction towards C on
the other side of I. In order to match up trajectories we have to make some assumption of how the
particles cross the region of interference. One cannot simply use classical intuition to help us through
this region because classical intuition will not give interference fringes. Therefore we cannot conclude
that the particles following the trajectories before they enter the region I are the same particles that
follow the trajectories after they have emerged from that region. This requires a knowledge of how the
particles cross the region I, a knowledge that is not supplied by CH.
Where the consistent histories (3) could provide a complete description is when the coherence between
the two paths is destroyed. This could happen if a measurement involving some irreversible process was
made in one of the beams. This would ensure that there was no interference occurring in the region I. In
this case the trajectories would go straight through. This would mean that the conditional probabilities
given in equation (5) would always be satisfied.
But in such a situation the Bohm trajectories would also go straight through. The particles coming
from MirrorM1 would trigger the detector C no matter where it was placed. The reason for this behaviour
in this case is because the wave function is no longer ψc + ψd, but we have two incoherent beams, one
described by ψc and the other by ψd. This gives rise to a different quantum potential which does not
cause the particles to be ‘reflected’ in the region I. So here there is no disagreements with CH.
4 Conclusion
When coherence between the two beams is destroyed it is possible to make meaningful inferences about
trajectories in CH. These trajectories imply that any particle reflected from the mirror M1 must end
up in detector C. In the Bohm approach exactly the same conclusion is reached so that where the two
approaches can be compared they predict exactly the same results.
When the coherence between the two beams is preserved then CH must use the consistent histories
described by equation (6). These histories do not allow any inferences about trajectories to be drawn.
Although the consistent histories described by equation (3) enable us to make inferences about particle
trajectories because, as we have shown they lead to disagreement with experiment. Unlike the situation
in CH the Bohm approach can define the notion of a trajectory which is calculated from the real part of
the Schro¨dinger equation under polar decomposition. These trajectories are well defined and continuous
throughout the experiment including the region of interference. Since CH cannot make any meaningful
statements about trajectories in this case it cannot be used to draw any significant conclusions concerning
the validity or otherwise of the Bohm trajectories. Thus the claim by Griffiths [5], namely, that the CH
gives a more reasonable account of the behaviour of particle trajectories interference experiment shown
in Figure 1 than that provided by the Bohm approach cannot be sustained.
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